This article argues that the four main measures introduced in the 2014 reform of the Procurement Directives to promote Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) cannot be classified as measures favouring SMEs. A measure favours SMEs when it compromises the main objectives of competition, non-discrimination and value for money. The discussion covers the regimes on the division of larger contracts into lots, the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD), minimum turnover requirements, and direct payments to subcontractors.
I. Introduction
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) are the dominant life form in the economies of all EU Member States. 20.8 million SMEs were registered in the then 27 EU Member States in 2011. They amounted to 99.8% of all enterprises and contributed more than half of the Union's GDP.
1 Their share of public contracts, however, is often deemed insufficient. In contrast to old Directive 2004/18/EC, Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU 2 includes measures designed -not to directly increase the proportion of SMEs being awarded public contracts -but to improve their tendering conditions and thereby facilitate and encourage and thus increase their participation in public procurement procedures. Thus, the Directive contains four main 'innovations' directed at increasing SME participation in public procurement: the division of contracts into lots (III.), the European Single Procurement Document (IV.), the limitation of requirements for participation (V.), and direct payments to subcontractors (VI.).
3 Directive 2014/24/EU also introduced a number of additional measures for SMEs in less obvious places. Filling a gap in the literature regarding the use of public procurement regulation to promote SMEs in general and the innovations of Directive 2014/24/EU in this matter in particular, this article will provide a short legal analysis of these four 'European' SME regimes to address the basic question whether they can be considered as measures favouring SMEs through public procurement. The question is not whether these regimes amount to a legal framework that makes SME promotion a sustainable goal, as the introduction of four new techniques expressly intended to promote SMEs clearly makes SME participation an objective of Directive 2014/24/EU, an intention clearly declared in Recital 124. The analysis will be based on the understanding that a measure for the promotion of SMEs in public procurement constitutes a regime favouring 5 SMEs when the procurement rules are adjusted for that purpose to an extent that compromises the primary objectives of competition and value for money, of the contracting authority procuring what it needs to operate at the best possible terms.
6 With regards to the EU Procurement Directives, a provision favouring SMEs would also compromise their specific primary objectives of non-discrimination (on grounds of nationality) and equal treatment.
7 A provision clearly favouring SMEs to an extent that the primary objectives are compromised would be, for example, provisions comparable to those of the US Small Businesses Act requiring a minimum number of SMEs to be selected in competitive procedures, 8 or procurement procedures limited to SMEs comparable to the reserved contracts for sheltered workshops now regulated in Article 20 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
9 Another example would be a margin of preference for SMEs at the contract award stage comparable to the "targeted procurement" in favour of previously disadvantaged businesses in post-Apartheid South Africa.
10 Competition would be limited by either excluding or disadvantaging large companies in favour of SMEs. In contrast, what Burgi calls "SME-fair"
11 or "SME-friendly" 12 measures and what Lichère calls measures "facilitating SME access"
13 aim to increase competition by levelling the playing field by addressing the specific problems that often prevent or compromise their participation. This differentiation is important because the introduction of SME favouring measures would represent a considerable change -away from the primary objectives, whereas merely facilitating SME access does not compromise the primary objectives. Based on this understanding, it will be argued that, with the exception of a few details, the four SME-friendly ple in Recital 59 where the Commission calls for the monitoring of the aggregation of demand as a practice that has the potential to disadvantage SMEs. According to Susie Smith, who discussed this matter with the author in late September 2016, large scale dynamic purchasing systems appear to prove a particularly effective regime to increase SME participation in the UK. Promoting SMEs through public procurement is a long-standing policy of the EU, see 6 See the differentiation between "SME-fair" and "SME-favouring" in M Burgi, 'Small and medium-sized enterprises and procurement law ' (2007) 11 Burgi (n 6), 297-288.
12 M Burgi, 'Mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe -Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Teil I)' (2006) 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Bau-und Vergaberecht, 606-610: The German term "mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe" is to be translated as 'SME-friendly'. However, in the introduction on page 606 Burgi uses the term mittelstandsgerechte Auftragsvergabe which is to be translated as 'SME-fair'. The latter term is preferable because it merely suggests levelling the playing field whereas the earlier term suggests a certain degree of preference, which is precisely not what it aims to describe.
13 Lichère (n 5), 110. 
II. Background
There is no universally accepted definition of an SME and the precise understanding of the concept also varies in the Member States. 14 However, for its purposes Article 83(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU adopted Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, which defines SMEs as enterprises with up to 250 employees and an annual turnover of up to €50 million and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million.
15 A further differentiation is provided with definitions of micro-, 16 small-, 17 and mediumsize enterprises.
18 This definition is used for the purposes of this article.
19
A problem caused by any measures promoting SME participation, in addition to the danger of national or even regional protectionism, 20 is that such measures will make the applicable procurement law more complicated and therefore less user-friendly and prone to violations and litigation. This can be a deterrence for SME participation in itself.
21 Moreover, these measures can lead to additional costs. Related to these problems, the promotion of SMEs is often classified as a secondary, 22 sustainable, 23 horizontal, 24 or strategic objective or goal, 25 as a 'community benefit', 26 akin to social or environmental 27 considerations in public procurement. While there is strong support for the use of public procurement to promote 'secondary' considerations, 28 these are objectives in addition to and possibly compromising the primary objective of public procurement, which is to provide the public authority with the supplies and services it needs to operate, connected to value for money and non-discrimination objectives and the 'vehicles' of competition and transparency to achieve them.
29 A conflict arises inter alia when the economically most advantageous tender is not awarded the contract or the costs of the procedure are higher because of the 'horizontal' objective. 35 However, the protectionist aspect of the objective has to be put into perspective: not all SMEs can be seen as only local and therefore national enterprises. The division into lots discussed below, for example, may well lead to, for example, more Moravian SMEs bidding for smaller contracts in Bavaria, Lower Austria, or Upper Silesia.
The economic importance of SMEs has an impact on the discussion of whether the promotion of SMEs is seen as a secondary or horizontal or strategic objective of public procurement regulation at all. The Germans, for example, traditionally more reserved about these objectives, which they used to call 'aspects alien to procurement', 36 see SME promotion as a separate issue.
37 More SME participation in public contracts could increase competition through a wider and more innovative supplier and provider base and thus have an effect on the objective of value for money. 38 Economic theory supports this positive effect on competition, and also emphasises that specialised SMEs can be more efficient on certain contracts or contract parts requiring their specialism, and that their participation makes collusion between the big companies more complicated.
39
Moreover, since in contrast to large companies SMEs exist in all and especially also the smaller Member States, the participation of these companies has also an Internal Market dimension, furthering the free movement of goods and services (including works) in all Member States. In other words, it promotes a European procurement market not just for big business in big Member States. However, SMEs create proportionately more employment than large companies, train more people, provide economic stability even during an economic crisis, and are loyal to the regions in which they are based.
40 For all these reasons, which as Burgi rightly points out are difficult or impossible to quantify, 41 SMEs are close to the heart of politicians in all the Member States, as shown inter alia by the references to SMEs in Articles 158(2)(b), 173(1) and 179(2) TFEU.
42 Nevertheless, these reasons are more in line with secondary or horizontal objectives and explain why, as in this article, the promotion of SME participation in public procurement is often also discussed as a sustainable goal.
III. Division into Lots
A public contract can be awarded as a single contract to only one prime contractor or it can be divided into several smaller parts or lots which are then awarded separately and possibly to different contractors. A procurement can involve the award of a contract for a complete airport, for example. Alternatively, that contract can be divided into lots, say one for the construction of the terminal, another for the construction of the runways, and yet another one for all electrical appliances, and so on. Public contracts can be divided into lots until any resulting lot becomes undividable.
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Lots can be homogeneous 44 and heterogeneous. 45 Regarding the number of lots, there is some evidence indicating that a division into many lots (more than 10) considerably increases the participation and chances of micro-and small companies of being awarded the contract. In contrast, the division into only a few lots (2-4) reduces participation from small, medium-sized, and large enterprises and only increases participation and chances of micro-companies.
46 Additionally, the size of the lots determines which companies have sufficient capacity to bid for at least one lot.
47 However, awarding a single large contract lowers administrative costs 48 and increases buying power 49 and economies of scale.
50 Moreover, division might undermine the effectiveness of procurement when it is not technically or economically feasible or when the number of 40 Burgi (n 6), 285. 52 This is clearly intended as a technique to promote SME participation in public procurement.
53 According to Article 46(4), Member States may also require rather than just allow the division into separate lots in their national laws transposing the Directive.
54 However, in cases in which this has not been made obligatory by the transposing national law 55 or when not dividing into lots is allowed in certain cases, 56 contracting authorities shall indicate the main reasons for their decision not to divide into lots. This means that the division into lots is the default approach suggested by the Directive and Member States have the option to make this obligatory for all or parts of the contracts subject to the Directive and their transposing national laws.
However, the new Directive does not require the division into lots, although the decision not to divide a contract into lots requires a communication of the reasons: the "divide or explain principle".
57 This raises many questions in Member States (such as the UK) that have opted for divide or explain in their transposing laws. How difficult is it not to divide and explain? Does there have to be a good 'excuse' or is 'explaining' merely a formality that can be satisfied by providing 'cut and paste' generic reasons? Can the decision not to divide and explain be subject to judicial review in the Member State or through an enforcement action against the Member State? However, these largely open questions do not impact on the research question of this article, since as argued below, not even the compulsory division into lots qualifies as a measure favouring SMEs.
Lot Bundling
According to Article 46(2), the transposing national laws may provide that bids "may be submitted for one, for several or for all of the lots" of a divided contract (lot bundling). However, "even where tenders may be submitted for several or all lots, [the contracting authority may] limit the number of lots that may be awarded to one tenderer".
58 Furthermore, according to Article 46(3) the transposing legislation may provide that "more than one lot may be awarded to the same tenderer," and that "contracting authorities may award contracts combining several or all lots." The transparency requirements that come with these paragraphs essentially provide that the contract notice must state how many bids for how many lots are allowed. Thus Article 46(2)-(3) allows the use of several approaches. Limiting lot bundling can amount to a measure favouring SMEs because larger companies cannot benefit from their advantages (economies of scale) leading to higher prices for individual lots. However, such an approach is possible but not required by the Directive and might even be left to be decided by contracting authorities. Whether an approach on lot bundling represents a regime favouring SMEs thus depends on transposition and practice.
Alternative Bids
It is not clear whether Article 46 allows a bidder to make different bids for each lot on the one hand and a different and probably lower one if he or she is 59 It could be argued that prohibiting rebates goes beyond a SME-friendly levelling of the playing field. Rebates affect the question of whether a procurement law favours SMEs to an extent that negatively affects value for money. Not allowing the described rebate would be an SME favouring measure since in the end a (significantly) higher price could be paid for the contract as a whole.
60 It is argued that this would go against the objectives of Article 46 for the same reason. If rebates can be offered for all the lots then the SMEs for which the contract has been divided will be priced out of the competition, thereby undermining the objectives of the division into lots. However, the Directive 61 is not clear on this question and a judgment of the Court of Justice might be required and it is possible the Court would rule against rebates as they undermine the SME-friendly purpose of Article 46. France, as Lichère reports "surprisingly", 62 allowed the previously banned alternative bids in its 2016 transposing legislation.
63 Lichère also points out, that allowing alternative bids with rebates is good for the public purse but less so for SMEs.
64 He argues that if the French legislator really wanted to favour SMEs they better revert to the prohibition of alternative bids, although this would take economies of scale out of public contracts.
65 Thus, this old French approach to alternative bids represented a measure favouring SMEs. It is remarkable that the new Directive with its SME-friendly objectives appears to have led to the repeal of an SME favouring measure. However, this also proves how low the level of harmonisation actually is: Member States are left with considerable legislative discretion.
Favouring SMEs?
Overall, it is argued that for reasons related to division into lots regimes in general and to Article 46 in particular, the division into lots regime in Article 46 of Directive 2014/24/EU cannot be classified as a regime favouring SMEs. In comparison to the award of one large contract, dividing it into lots will often cause extra costs, for example, through additional staff time. However, competitive procurement procedures also have this effect in comparison to single source procurement. Competition created by competitive procurement procedures will regularly more than compensate for the additional costs and effort involved. The additional competition created by the facilitation of SME participation 66 will regularly have a similar effect. The devil is in the detail, namely in the rules on bundling and alternative bids. As both appear to be allowed, the competition through the participation of larger companies who can use their advantages can be maintained. These details are important to ensure that SMEs can participate in addition rather than instead of large companies, thereby ensuring an increase in competition. If an increase in competition and thus lower prices and other economic advantages can be achieved, then value for money is enhanced and not compromised, as would be the case most importantly with reserved contracts. Moreover, the level of harmonisation is set too low for Article 46 itself to qualify as a measure favouring SMEs. Only the transposition of Article 46 may have this effect, possibly through an excessively rigid regime of compulsory division and especially by limitations of lot bundling and alternative bids. Such approaches to transposition are possible due to the low intensity of harmonisation and lack of clarity in certain aspects. However, it would be national legislative decisions and not EU harmonisation which would compromise competition and thus constitute a measure favouring SMEs.
IV. The European Single Procurement Document (ESPD)
One of the main challenges of SMEs participation in public procurement are the significant costs and administrative burden associated with the documentation required for the qualification stage of the procurement process. 67 These obstacles derive from the obligation of economic operators to provide documentary evidence of their compliance with tender terms and conditions at the very beginning of the procurement procedure. The ESPD was introduced inter alia to resolve these issues, 68 as a part of a wider European public procurement reform aimed at simplification, red tape reduction, and streamlining the documentation requirements. 69 The ESPD is not strictly intended as an instrument to promote SMEs participation in public procurement -a reduction in red tape would also relieve larger bidders. The ambition of the legislator was for the ESPD to simplify cross-border procurement and help providing access to new opportunities for businesses, including SMEs.
70 However, larger companies have the resources to deal with red tape giving them an advantage over SMEs which do not or less so. Therefore, a reduction of red tape could facilitate the participation of SMEs by levelling the playing field without disadvantaging large companies, except through the increased competition. In order to ascertain whether it is a measure favouring SMEs it is necessary to look at some details of the ESDP regime.
Features of the ESDP
The ESPD is a standard self-declaration designed as a 'one size fits all' blueprint which, in principle, an economic operator completes once and can reuse in any future tender. It replaces the obligation of presenting originals of all pre-qualification documents and represents a means of preliminary evidence for the bidder meeting the tender requirements (exclusion grounds [ 71 The ESPD is divided into six parts which shall include information regarding: 1) procurement procedure and contracting authority; 2) economic operator; 3) exclusion criteria; 4) selection criteria; 5) reduction of the number of qualified candidates; and 6) concluding statements.
72 As all six parts make cross-references to the procurement documents, in practice the ESPD will need to be completed for each procurement individually. Thus, the ESDP is failing in its ambition to be a single standard for multiple procurements. This may be particularly the case when a procurement is to include aspects such as lots, subcontracting, or relying on third party capabilities, or all of these, or a variation of them. 73 When a public contract is to be divided into lots, a specific ESPD is to be provided for each lot. If the contract is to include subcontracting, a contracting authority may require subcontractors to complete appropriate parts of their own ESPDs. 74 If the bidder relies on third party capabilities, each third party will need to complete its own separate ESPD.
The completed ESPD is to be submitted with the tender in open procedures, or with the request to participate in other procurement procedures.
75 Only the successful bidder is then to submit 'without delay' 76 the updated, full supporting documentation, on the request of the contracting authority, before the award of the contract. 77 The successful bidder is not required to provide the full documentation if that can be acquired "directly by accessing a national database in any Member State that is available free of charge, such as the national procurement register, a virtual company dossier, an electronic document storage system, or a prequalification system", or when the contracting authority already possesses these documents. The ESPD service is integrated with E-Certis, a free online mapping tool used to identify and compare certificates requested in public procurement procedures across the EU. It is not obligatory for contracting authorities to request an ESPD, but there is a clear obligation to accept a submitted ESPD as a preliminary and sufficient evidence of its compliance with the procurement terms and conditions. 78 
A Shift of Costs and Burden Away from Economic Operators?
It is argued that the ESPD leads to additional costs, administrative burden, and increase in complexity in procurement procedures for the contracting authorities. Thus, it is questionable whether simplification and cost savings can be achieved on both sides of the procurement relationship. Rather, a transfer of the related costs and obligations from the economic operator to the contracting authority takes place.
Contracting authorities now have to locate the relevant information among the copies of documents they already possess or in freely available databases. 79 Telles welcomes this shift as an incentive for contracting authorities to request only the necessary documents, as they will bear the costs and have to make the effort, rather than the economic operators, as before 2014. 80 However, this shift of burden creates several challenges.
Firstly, the contracting authority needs to conduct 'intelligence' work to acquire the necessary information. For example, the ESPD includes a new obligation derived from Article 59 to ensure that no person serving on the economic operator's administrative, management and supervisory bodies, or with powers of representation, decision or control therein, has been the subject of a conviction of crimes such as corruption, fraud, terrorism, child labour, etc.
81 The contracting authority must check the criminal records of members of the successful bidder. The process of verification is often resource-intensive and may potentially introduce unequal treatment among economic operators. The latter follows from the fact that in some Member States there is no criminal records database (such as the UK). Therefore, the ESPD will need to suffice, while in other Member States economic operators need to present multiple excerpts of criminal records, while bearing the increased costs of participation. If the criminal records need to be checked for large framework agreements then this will require resources of personnel and time. Contracting authorities must obtain permission in writing from the economic operator to retrieve the records of relevant persons working for the latter. Due to issues of data protection and privacy, such records cannot be copied or sent via email. The contracting authority can only check the records, but it cannot store them for a longer peri- od. Consequently, the records must be either destroyed or returned to the economic operator or a special digital form of data sharing will have to be introduced. According to a Finnish practitioner, the complexity of the process is counter-productive, as the bidders prefer a visit to the contracting authority to show the original records -tangibly -rather than take advantage of the benefits of digitalisation.
82
Another related issue regards the documents contracting authorities 'already possess'. If the contracting authority is a small organisation there seems to be no problem in identifying the correct file. However, if the contracting authority has many departments simultaneously conducting various procurements, locating the documents may be both challenging and time-consuming, unless a proper record keeping system is in place. Not to mention that it may be problematic to asses if the information included in such documents is updated or if it is not defective in some way, e.g. whether the names of the company's representatives on the submitted documents correspond with the current certificate of incorporation or whether all the licenses or certificates are still valid.
83
Secondly, the use of the ESPD introduces a risk of non-compliance with the principle of equal treatment in the context of two-stage procurement processes. An economic operator may be admitted to the tender stage even if it does not meet the relevant selection criteria as the ESPD shifts the stage of assessing documentation from the beginning of the procedure to the last stage of the procurement process. In the worst case scenario, after a long procurement process (i.e. competitive dialogue), a contracting authority may find itself in a situation where the successful bidder proves to be ineligible.
84 This may be due to the provision of false (fraudulent) or inaccurate information, or failure to meet requirements the economic operator only thought it meets.
85
This scenario is particularly risky as it may lead to a waste of time and resources, potentially requiring repetition of at least part of the procurement process. Alternatively, the contracting authority may be tempted to turn a blind eye to a lack of compliance with selection criteria to escape the need of retendering or terminating the procurement procedure.
86
These risks seem to be acknowledged by the EU legislator in Recital 84, where it is stated that in twostage procedures contracting authorities may require original documentation at the selection stage. Article 59(4) establishes that contracting authorities retain the right of requesting the originals of the documents at their discretion, which may be helpful in the context of two-stage procedures.
Thirdly, the ESPD was expected to reduce the administrative burden. The reason why the achievement of this objective is questionable is due to the possible argument that the self-declaration introduces a new layer of complexity for the contracting authorities. The ESPD makes it more difficult for contracting authorities to apply relevant selection criteria as it limits their discretion: they have to rely on a 'one-size-fits-all' ESPD form and try to fit all types of procurement into it, without due regard to the frequently arising necessity of more specific and elaborated documentation requirements.
87 This 'fitting and adjusting' exercise may lead to delays in procurement, due to the need for further clarifications. 84 The failure of the economic operator to provide the necessary documentation as evidence for the self-declarations made in the ESPD constitute a discretionary ground for exclusion (Article 57 (4)(h)), which the contracting authority can apply any time (Article 57(5)).
85 On serious misrepresentation when supplying information requested by the contracting authority, see Case C-387/14 Esaprojekt [2017] ECLI-338.
86 In practice, there may be lack of incentive on the side of contracting authorities, due to the used resources and cost. Similar lack of incentive is present in cases of sustainable procurement performance clauses. Even when they are not respected, contracting authorities rarely if at all terminate the contract. to some extent, to the contracting authorities' costs, administrative burden, and the complexity of procurement procedures, this is more than compensated for by the gains through increased competition. Moreover, the ESDP is part of the broader reform towards simplification and digitalisation of procurement in general, and not solely for the promotion of SMEs. Furthermore, the costs, administrative burden, and complexity are possibly only a temporary phenomenon, until contracting authorities learn how to use the new tool and until harmonised, digitalised systems are in place. Finally, it could be argued that the negative impact of the ESPD on contracting authorities stems from inappropriate practices rather than interpreting the rules as part of a move towards favouring SMEs. Contracting authorities are likely to learn and adapt and in the process, most of the costs, administrative burden, and complexity will gradually be reduced.
V. The Minimum Turnover Requirement (Cap)
Article 58 includes a list of possible requirements for participation in procurement procedures. These concern the suitability of the bidders to pursue the relevant professional activity, their economic and financial standing, and their technical and professional ability. Until recently, contracting authorities exercised a 'fair degree' of discretion when establishing turnover requirements. 89 The only limitations of that discretion followed from the need to consider the specifics of the particular contract, and to respect the proportionality principle.
90 Specifying particularly onerous economic and financial standing criteria may lead to diminished competition or block the access of SMEs to procurement markets. 91 Moreover, financial requirements, especially the burdensome minimal turnover, have been over-used by contracting authorities in the past, thus hindering SME participation in public procurement.
92 SMEs' size, limited financial resources and access to financing makes bidding above certain turnover requirements too risky or simply impossible. Recital 83 acknowledges this effect by noting that:
overly demanding requirements concerning economic and financial capacity frequently constitute an unjustified obstacle to the involvement of SMEs in public procurement. Any such requirements should be related and proportionate to the subjectmatter of the contract.
The Cap
To address and mitigate this issue, Article 58 (3) introduces a new cap limiting minimum turnover requirements to a maximum of twice the contract value. The introduction of this provision is clearly intended as a method of promoting SMEs participation in public procurement. It follows from the assessment of the EU procurement reform process. At first, the Commission had proposed to introduce a higher turnover cap of three times the contract value.
93
Then, based on the report from the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IM-CO) the provision on turnover was reduced to the current level. 94 Based on an assessment of the contract award notices for above the thresholds contracts published on TED in 2012, reducing the turnover criteria from thrice to twice the contract value appears to open a sizeable new market tranche (improvement of 8% participation) for 'typical' micro-enterprises.
95
Considering that SME organisations such as UEAPME had demanded for a turnover requirement cap of five times the contract value, 96 the final ver- 
Sufficiently Protecting Contracting Authorities?
The new minimum turnover limitation raises the question of whether it favours SMEs by neglecting the valid interests and concerns of contracting authorities. Contracting authorities and, consequently, public procurement processes need to be protected from possible illiquidity and financial distress of economic operators. In other words, by requiring too small a minimum turnover, contracting authorities expose themselves to a higher risk of procurement failure thus compromising the primary objective of procuring what they need to operate under the best possible terms. This can be particularly important if Article 58 (3) is interpreted as limiting the minimum turnover to twice the annual value of the contract, rather than its total value. 97 The rationale for such interpretation would be that in many contracts SMEs would be unable to participate if the contracting authorities required the minimum of double the total value of the contract. Thus, favouring SMEs would suggest interpreting the rules as referring to annual value. However, this would be improper, as in cases of long-term public contracts requiring large investments SMEs with a sole double annual turnover will be most presumably unable to carry out the necessary investment and thus pose a risk to the execution of the entire procurement contract. Consequently, the Article 58 (3) should be interpreted as referring to the total value of the contract rather than the annual value.
To alleviate the potential risk coming with the new cap, Article 58 (3) enables contracting authorities to increase the requirement beyond the existing limitation in 'duly justified cases'. This refers to cases "such as relating to the special risks attached to the nature of the works, services or supplies". The wording of the provision is not very clear -the only certain aspect is that the exception shall be interpreted narrowly to avoid abuses of discretion. This argument is supported by the fact that contracting authorities "shall indicate the main reasons for such a requirement in the procurement documents or the individual report referred to in Article 84." In other words, if a contracting authority wishes to apply more burdensome requirements regarding the yearly turnover of the economic operator, it needs to document its decision as well as reasons for taking it.
Furthermore, the turnover limitation shall be attuned in situations where the contract is divided into lots. In such cases, the contracting authorities shall apply [the rule] in relation to each individual lot. However, contracting authorities may set the minimum yearly turnover that economic operators are required to have by reference to groups of lots in the event that the successful tenderer is awarded several lots to be executed at the same time.
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If the contract is to be awarded on the basis of framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems, the limiting turnover cap should be calculated on the basis of the expected maximum size of specific contracts. In cases of contracts divided into many lowvalue lots or awarded under a framework agreement with many economic operators, the cap limitation of twice the contract value may still be too high. Therefore, it is important to read the rules of Article 58 (3) in conjunction with Article 58 (1), so that established limitations are "strictly proportionate to the subjectmatter of the contract". That may lead to the conclusion that in particular cases setting a minimum turnover at twice the contract value may be disproportionate and it should be lower.
Favouring SMEs?
While larger companies also benefit from a lower minimum turnover requirement, they can normally meet higher requirements, so that the new cap clearly promotes SME participation. However, it is argued that minimum turnover requirements cannot be categorised as a provision that favours SMEs. This is because, firstly, even though Directive 2014/24/EU introduces higher risks for contracting authorities by setting a relatively low turnover cap, it provides contracting authorities with a 'protective shield' through the exception provision in 'duly justified cases'. Secondly, contracting authorities have other tools to mitigate the risk at their disposal, including a track Thirdly, a certain level of protection is still provided by this minimum turnover requirement. Finally, it is argued that the higher risk of contracting authorities is compensated by the fruits of increased competition.
VI. Direct Payments to Subcontractors
There are many SMEs which are perfectly capable to act as prime contractors and have been awarded and successfully performed public works, supplies, and services contracts. However, due to their limited size as well as technical and financial capacity many SMEs will be subcontractors in, at times, very long supply chains of large companies acting as prime contractors. There is a close connection between procurement rules promoting SME participation and procurement rules regulating subcontracting and the supply chain. Article 25 of the old Directive 2004/18/EC was very short on this matter by only requiring:
In the contract documents, the contracting authority may ask or may be required by a Member State to ask the tenderer to indicate in his tender any share of the contract he may intend to subcontract to third parties and any proposed subcontractors.
This information requirement was only complemented by a reference to prime contractor liability. 100
Bypassing the Prime Contractor
However, Article 71(3) Directive 2014/24/EU was also introduced: Member States may provide that at the request of the subcontractor and where the nature of the contract so allows, the contracting authority shall transfer due payments directly to the subcontractor for services, supplies or works provided to the economic operator to whom the public contract has been awarded (the main contractor). Such measures may include appropriate mechanisms permitting the main contractor to object to undue payments. The arrangements concerning that mode of payment shall be set out in the procurement documents.
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Thus, Member States can provide in their transposing laws that subcontractors are paid directly by the contracting authority rather than having to wait for payments from the prime contractor. This offers subcontractors, which are often SMEs, an efficient way of protecting their interest in being paid. However, not all subcontractors are SMEs and therefore this provision might equally benefit large companies when acting as subcontractors. Nevertheless, inter alia the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2011 Draft leading to the 2014 Directive clearly identifies this as one of four main measures to promote SME participation in public procurement.
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The July 2013 Draft and 2014 final text changed the wording of the 2011 Draft slightly as procedures permitting prime contractors to object to undue payments now only may be included, whereas in the 2011 Draft they had to be put in place. According to Article 71(7) of Directive 2014/24/EU Member States may "go further under national law on direct payments to subcontractors"; this can include a requirement for direct payments to subcontractors without them having to request them. Moreover, according to Article 71(8) Member States having chosen to provide for measures pursuant to inter alia Article 71(3) must specify the implementing conditions for those measures. Member States may limit the applicability of these implementing measures, "for instance in respect of certain types of contracts, certain categories of contacting authorities or economic operators or as of certain amounts." However, the general direct payment rule in Article 71(3), the possibility to go further in Article 71(7) on the one hand, and the possibility to limit the applicability of the rule on the other hand are options -Member States do not even have to implement the direct payment regime of the Directive at all, they can limit it and/or extend it. the supply chain, does not implement the direct payment regime of the Directive. Moreover, according to Article 71(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, direct payments should only be provided "where the nature of the contract so allows." It appears that this is subject to the judgment of the contracting authority and the impact of this reservation will depend on factors such as the extent to which this discretion is regulated or generally the criteria that should guide this assessment. There is no guidance for this assessment provided in Directive 2014/24/EU. Moreover, this will depend on whether the judgment of the contracting authority can be challenged, especially in review proceedings. The direct payment rule had been the only innovation to the subcontracting regime in the 2011 Draft Proposal. In the July 2013 Draft and the final 2014 Directive, Article 71 was significantly extended. However, it needs to be emphasised that the remainder of this subcontracting regime of the new Directive in its Article 71 (1)-(2), (4)-(6) and most of (8) of Directive 2014/24/EU does not promote the access of SMEs to public contracts as such. These paragraphs regulate issues such as ensuring that the social and environmental requirements applicable to prime contractors are also fulfilled by subcontractors, information requirements for prime contractors on their subcontractors, liability rules, and the qualification and exclusion of subcontractors. Therefore, the SME friend- 
Favouring SMEs?
It is submitted that the direct payments to subcontractors do not favour SMEs adding to the costs or administrative burden or complexity to be shouldered by contracting authorities. During the consultation process, a majority of public authorities and civil society organisations favoured allowing public procurers to have more influence on subcontracting by the successful tenderer, while the other stakeholder groups rejected such a possibility.
104 "Other stakeholders" will mainly refer to prime contractors and their opposition is understandable since a more detailed regulation of their subcontracting interferes with their freedom of contract. This opposition of prime contractors might imply a possible negative effect of the direct payments rule on competition as it might deter prime contractors. This could be interpreted as a cost for contracting authorities. However, there is no evidence for such an effect and this was not indicated in the Green Paper either.
The direct payment rule would also only add little to the complexity of the procurement process burdening contracting authorities. They would have to have a clear idea of the subcontractors and initiate payments but this complexity would arguably be too limited to be characterised as a rule that is favouring SMEs.
VII. Conclusions
This article argued that none of the four innovations of Directive 2014/24/EU introduced to facilitate the participation of SMEs in public procurement can be classified as regimes favouring SMEs, to promote the participation of these economic operators to an extent that the primary objectives of efficient procurement, value for money, non-discrimination, and competition are significantly compromised. The division into lots will make procurement more complex for 104 Green Paper (n 66), 13: According to a figure (p. 5) 39% of stakeholders wanted more control of subcontracting and this is also mentioned under "other issues" (p. 18).
contracting authorities and cause them some costs, the ESDP will cause some costs and teething problems, the turnover requirement increases risk for contracting authorities, and the direct payment rule, if transposed, might irritate prime contractors. However, subject to transposition and actual practice, the costs and complications are limited and will be reduced over time and the potential increase in competition might well enhance value for money. Therefore, the four measures do not compromise the prime objectives of procurement but serve them to an extent. The promotion of SMEs as a sustainable goal is an added value of the 2014 reform -facilitating a secondary objective without compromising the primary objectives. Whether any of the four innovations are likely to actually meet their objective of increasing SME participation in public procurement is a different question for a different article.
